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ABSTRACT
This paper makes three contributions. First, I report information on the size of the Japanese
financial crisis. Drawing principally on work by Fukao (2003) and Doi and Hoshi (2003) I estimate
that the current taxpayer liability for losses incurred but yet to be recognized is likely to be at least
24% of GDP. Second, I explain why it has been so difficult to end the crisis. Third, I sketch the
likely ingredients of what will be required to successfully resolve the crisis. The overarching
principle is that Japan’s banks, insurance companies, and government financial agencies all suffer
different problems and require different solutions. But all three sectors are connected, and a failure
to tackle concurrently the problems of all three promises to doom any reform plan.
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Introduction and summary
Over the last decade, the Japanese economy has
underperformed dramatically—growing an average
of 1.1 percent per year versus 4.1 percent per year in
the previous ten years. At the same time, the country’s
financial system has fallen into disarray. Recently, the
debate over how to address the financial sector prob-
lems and the role that this should play in Japan’s eco-
nomic policy have come to the fore. For instance, the
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 2002 Japan coun-
try report proposes a four-part program to address the
decade long economic slump and to end the current
deflation. The first pillar of the program is to “deal
decisively with financial sector weaknesses.”
In September, the Bank of Japan (2002a) announced
an unusual policy initiative, whereby it would begin
buying equities that were held by banks. In announcing
this decision, the bank pointed to the importance of
resolving the nonperforming loan problem. It stated
that “in order to resolve the overall problem, a compre-
hensive and tenacious approach is needed, centering
on a more appropriate evaluation of nonperforming
loans, promotion of their early disposal, and efforts
towards higher profitability on the part of both firms
and financial institutions.”
The debate came to head when Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi replaced his financial services min-
ister and promised that he would deliver a plan for the
accelerated disposal of banks’ bad loans. The new finan-
cial services minister, Heizo Takenaka, promptly formed
the Financial Sector Emergency Response Project Team
to study the bad debt problem, with a promise that the
task force would issue an interim report within several
weeks and a full report within a month. Yet, when the
interim report was circulated in advance of its formal
release, the report’s analysis and recommendations were
heavily criticized by a number of politicians, and the re-
lease of the document had to be delayed multiple times.
In this article, I explain why a quick resolution to
this problem has not been possible. My central theme
is that the financial crisis is sufficiently broad and deep
that the necessary institutional changes cannot be ini-
tiated or implemented immediately. Nonetheless, many
of the ingredients of what will be required for a success-
ful resolution of the problem are clear. The overarch-
ing principle is that Japan’s banks, insurance companies,
and government financial agencies all suffer from dif-
ferent problems and require different solutions. But
all three sectors are connected, and a failure to tackle
concurrently the problems of all three promises to
doom any reform plan.
In the first section, I review the macroeconomic
factors that have caused the problems that are now
evident in the Japanese financial sector. Poor macro-
economic performance is central to the story, and in
this environment some strains on the financial system
were inevitable. But I show that macroeconomic con-
ditions alone cannot account for the problems. Instead,
one must also account for a host of sector-specific con-
siderations. In the next three sections, I review the chal-
lenges facing the reform of the banks, the insurance
companies, and the government financial institutions.
For each of the three, I provide some estimates on
the size of the losses and then explain what will be re-
quired to stop them from continuing.
Two primary conclusions emerge. First, the likely
cost of the financial problems to the taxpayer is huge:
My rough estimate of the lower bound for the full
cost is approximately 24 percent of Japanese gross
domestic product (GDP). Second, the interaction of a
number of factors contributes to delaying the resolu-
tion of the problems. This delay could easily raise the
costs of resolution.2
Role of macroeconomics in the
financial crisis
The combination of slow growth and
the decline of the aggregate price level
have each contributed to Japan’s financial
crisis. The single most important problem
for the financial sector has been the ane-
mic growth of the Japanese economy over
the last decade. Figure 1 shows GDP
growth over the last 45 years to put re-
cent performance in context. After aver-
aging more than 3.8 percent between
1974 and 1991, growth dropped to 1.1
percent over the last decade. Obviously, if
there had been more growth in the 1990s,
the financial sector would be in better
shape now.
The more challenging question is
how much the financial sector problems
themselves independently contributed to
the growth slowdown. A full answer to
this question is beyond the scope of this
article, but even without resolving it, it is
safe to conclude two things about the interplay be-
tween the financial sectors problems and growth.
First, it is implausible to argue that the decline in
stock and land prices at the beginning of the 1990s
can be blamed for the financial sector problems today.
This simple explanation fails because the banks and
government financial institutions continue to make
losses on new loans today. Therefore, the crisis cannot
accurately be described as merely delaying the recog-
nition of bad news. While the asset price collapse may
have triggered the problems, it cannot be blamed for
their continuation at this point. This is an important
conclusion because it suggests that ending the crisis
will require substantial changes in the financial insti-
tutions’ operating practices.
Second, recapitalizing the banks (and insurance
companies) would not be a sufficient step to restore
growth. The banking problems reflect the poor
conditions of their borrowers. Putting capital into banks
to make up for past losses would be pointless if the
underlying corporate problems are not addressed. As
Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2002) emphasize, the
growth problems today cannot be due solely to a lack
of solvent financial institutions. There have always
been international banks (and insurance companies)
operating in Japan, and the number rose substantially
as a result of the so-called “Big Bang” deregulation
that was completed in April of last year. These foreign
firms are solvent but are choosing not to lend much
in Japan. So the problem is not just that the domestic
financial institutions are undercapitalized. This is im-
portant because it suggests that merely throwing money
at the banks will not resolve the crisis.
Determining the appropriate policies to address
the problems is difficult. Bank of Japan officials have
often alleged that monetary policy is impotent because
of the banking problems (see, for example, Hayami,
2002). While it is true that standard open market op-
erations will not be stimulative if banks will not lend,
this by no means impairs other types of monetary
policy actions. For instance, the proposal by Svensson
(2001) for the Bank of Japan to stimulate the economy
through foreign exchange intervention is in no way
compromised by the banking problems.
On the other hand, without a functioning system
of financial intermediation, there are limits as to how
successful nontraditional monetary policy actions will
be. As growth resumes, government money will be
needed to combat some of the insolvencies that are
hampering normal financial intermediation. There is
a wide range of estimates of the degree of insolvency
in the banking industry. But, even without settling the
issue of how much it would cost to rehabilitate the
banks, it is possible to identify many rescue arrange-
ments that would be counterproductive in virtually
all potential scenarios. Later in this article, I highlight
many of these poor choices and give some loose bounds
on the costs of better alternatives.
The second major macroeconomic problem has
been the deflation that has accompanied the slow growth.
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As I explain below, the deflation has played a central
role in the problems of the insurance companies.
Besides this well-documented and widely discussed
effect, the deflation independently has had three per-
nicious effects on the banking sector.
First, as stressed by Fukao (2003), the deflation
squeezes banks profitability. Since nominal interest rates
cannot go below zero, there is a floor on the cost of the
banks’ funds. Even with zero interest rates, depositors
may be getting higher real returns than the banks would
like to pay. But the banks face competition in lending
and, consequently, limits on how much they can charge
their customers. With falling prices, banks find it dif-
ficult to charge more than 1 percent or 2 percent inter-
est on their loans (since the inflation-adjusted interest
burden is much higher). With deflation, the gap between
funding costs and lending rates is not sufficient for
the banks to make money. If the inflation rate were pos-
itive, the banks would have more room to maneuver.
The low nominal rates that are charged to bank
borrowers also complicate the problem of regulating
the banks. With near-zero interest rates, almost all bor-
rowers can make their required interest payments. Only
when a loan matures, and the principal is due, can one
gauge the health of the borrower. Since regulators are
not necessarily privy to the negotiations that accom-
pany a loan renewal, it can be difficult for them to spot
the problem borrowers. Japanese lenders often allow
borrowers with no hope of repayment to continue to
operate (see Peek and Rosengren, 2002). If interest rates
were 3 percent or 4 percent higher, then many of these
“zombie” borrowers would soon be unable to service
their debts. The regulators would then be able to easily
spot the deadbeat borrowers and pressure the banks
to cut them off, before more money is lost.
Finally, the deflation has meant that borrowers who
took out long-term loans at historically low rates of
interest (3 percent or 4 percent) have seen the inflation-
adjusted burden of their debt grow. This is the converse
of the more typical phenomenon, whereby borrowers
benefit from unexpected jumps in inflation at the
expense of lenders. One of the clear benefits from a
more expansionary monetary policy would be to re-
verse the increasing debt burdens.
Banking sector problems
I begin the sector-specific analysis by analyzing
the condition of the Japanese commercial banks. The
most thorough, up-to-date analysis of banks available
in English is Fukao (2003). Panel A in table 1 reproduces
his key figures. As he stresses, the banking industry has
not had a net operating profit since fiscal year 1993
(table 1, row G). Until late in the decade, the banks offset
these losses by recognizing capital gains on long-held
stocks and land. But at this point, there is little more that
can be squeezed from these sources. As table 1, row I
shows, since 1995 the banks have recorded net losses
in more years than not. Cumulating the loan loss fig-
ures in table 1 (row F) shows that the banks have re-
corded losses of roughly ¥83 trillion (16.5 percent of
current Japanese GDP) since 1992.1 According to Ja-
pan’s Financial Services Agency (FSA), this includes
over ¥32 trillion in outright write-offs! Yet the losses
are expected to continue for the foreseeable future.
As noted earlier, these losses are too large and per-
sistent to be blamed solely on the rapid decline in asset
prices at the beginning of the 1990s. Indeed, as the Bank
of Japan (2002b) has pointed out, since 1990 the banks
have disposed of more than ¥90 trillion, which amounts
to 80 percent of the increase in loans between 1986 and
1990. Thus, it is implausible to suggest that the contin-
ued losses can be attributed to misguided lending de-
cisions during the late 1980s. Rather, they are indicative
of deeper underlying problems facing the financial
services industry.
There are two complementary ways to analyze
the banks’ current problems that ultimately lead to
similar solutions about what might be done to reverse
their decline. One focuses on the banks’ current costs
and revenue structure, while the other looks at the
economic forces operating in the industry.
Flow profitability problems
The first approach puts the emphasis on the fail-
ure of the banks to generate enough revenue on their
loans and other assets to cover their funding and operat-
ing costs. To put this in perspective, the second panel
of table 1 reports U.S. data that are roughly comparable
to Fukao’s data for Japan.2 Despite the data limitations,
the comparison clearly shows that the Japanese banks
suffer from several structural problems. One is the
lack of profitability of their lending operations. The
Japanese banks’ interest margin relative to assets has
hovered around 120 basis points. The U.S. figures
(which include both fees associated with the loans and
interest revenue) are roughly three times as high—far
too big a difference to be attributable to the differences
in measurement.
Fukao notes that if the deflation were to stop, then
the banks could raise nominal interest rates without
raising the real interest burden for borrowers. But there
are limits to how much this could be expected to help.
For instance, assuming, optimistically, that when the
deflation ends the banks could raise their interest mar-
gin by 1 percentage point (say by increasing lending
rates by 2 percent and deposit rates by 1 percent), this















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While this might be enough to stop the banks’ losses,
they would still be far less profitable than their U.S.
counterparts.
Another problem is the Japanese banks’ high labor
costs. The banks have made some progress in reduc-
ing salary and wage expenses from roughly 52 percent
of operating costs to 46 percent. Although anecdotal
reports of overpaid and underutilized bank staff still
abound, the Japanese banks likely will have to increase
pay to some workers if they want to upgrade compe-
tency levels in order to increase fee- and commission-
based income. It is doubtful therefore that the Japanese
banks can push their salary expenses all the way down
to the U.S. level of about 42 percent of operating costs.
Finally, while not evident in the table, it is also well
known that the Japanese banks underinvested in tech-
nology during the last half of the 1990s. This has long
been recognized as a problem. For example, although
a condition of government-provided funds offered to
the banks in 1999 was that the banks had to improve
efficiency and reduce costs, the general cutbacks in in-
vestment were not to be extended to investment in com-
puting and automation. Still, more than three years later,
the concerns about poor computing operations persist.
The failure of the Mizuho Group’s computers that
occurred on the first day that the bank began operating
could hardly have been more symbolic. Due to poor
integration of the three merging banks’ antiquated
systems, the new bank’s computers failed. As a result,
the ATM network was unavailable, a number of auto-
matic payments were not made, and many customers
were double-billed for credit card transactions.3 The
Bank of Japan subsequently had to order Mizuho to
upgrade its computing systems.
Fukao reports that the main funds payment system
used by Japanese banks (zengin) is unable to handle two-
byte codes, and hence cannot transmit customer names
and messages in kanji (characters). This is one of the
reasons why convenience stores (that have typically
installed more sophisticated technology) have won
customers that would like to make an occasional
electronic payment at the banks’ expense. The zengin
system is scheduled for an upgrade in April 2003, but
the banks will have to do much more if they want to
match the technological efficiency of many of their
global competitors.
Japanese banks’ limited comparative advantage
The alternative (and complementary) approach to
analyzing the banks’ profitability problems is to look
at their product mix and ask which lines of business
can be expected to earn normal rates of return? The
Japanese banks are among the largest in the world in
terms of assets. For instance, Agosta (2002) reports
that the Mizuho Group and Mitsubishi Tokyo Finan-
cial Group are the first and third largest in the world,
respectively, and that 19 of the largest 100 banks in
the world are Japanese. Yet, there are few if any prod-
uct lines for which the Japanese banks are world
leaders. I find no examples where Japanese banks and
their global rivals have competed for business on a
level playing field and the Japanese banks have emerged
as market leaders. Instead, the recurring pattern is that
Japanese banks are later to enter markets or offer new
products and, consequently, their profitability lags.
The low levels of fee income alluded to earlier are
a particularly important reflection of this problem. As
Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) note, for the Japanese banks
in aggregate, fee and commission income as a percent-
age of total income was essentially identical in 1976
and 1996; the U.S. banks during this period increased
their percentage of fee and commission income by two-
and-a-half times. This disparity partially was attributable
to regulation that handicapped the Japanese banks. For
instance, until 1998 the banks were simply barred from
many activities, such as over-the-counter derivatives
transactions, brokerage activities, and underwriting.
But even after the full deregulation that was com-
pleted on April 1, 2001, the gap persists. The last row
in panel A of table 1 shows that the Japanese banks
continue to make roughly 76 percent of their income
(excluding capital gains) from their lending operations.
In contrast, U.S. banks make only 58 percent of their
income from this low margin activity; instead they
bring in a much higher percentage of high margin fee
and commission businesses.4 Since these nontradition-
al products and the associated revenue streams are
central to the business strategies of most global banks,
this deficiency is a huge problem for the Japanese banks.
Without making comparable profits in these areas, it
is hard to see how the Japanese banks could ever
reach the same rates of return as their competitors.
One way to address this problem would be for
Japan’s major banks to scale back on their operations
and to focus on niche needs of Japanese customers
(mostly small and medium-sized businesses). Japanese
banks might arguably be better than foreign banks
operating in Japan in this product line. The loan demand
of these customers, however, is much lower than the
assets of the current banking system; therefore, shift-
ing in this direction in order to raise profitability would
imply considerable downsizing. But downsizing would
involve the release of many mid-career and upper level
managers, who might face significant hurdles in be-
coming reemployed.
A final, further impediment to the banks’ profit-
ability is the difficult competition that they face from6
subsidized government financial institutions. The postal
savings system poses a particularly big problem. As
Fukao asks, how can the private banks make profits
when Japan’s government-sponsored postal savings
system has 40 times the number of offices of the
largest banking group, pays roughly the same rate on
deposits as the banks, and charges no maintenance fees?
The extra convenience of the postal accounts, combined
with the government guarantee of deposits, represents
a major challenge for the banks.
The government-subsidized Housing Loan Corpora-
tion (HLC) also compromises the banks’ ability to make
money through home mortgage lending. The HLC re-
ceives subsidies (as described below) from the govern-
ment and passes these savings on to their customers. The
HLC makes about 40 percent of all home mortgages.
Fukao (2003, table 8) shows that the HLC loans have rates
that are substantially lower than those offered by pri-
vate banks, despite typically having longer maturities.
Moreover, the HLC loans come with no prepayment
penalties (unlike typical Japanese bank mortgages).
These kinds of government-sponsored financial
institutions will have to be reined in if Japanese banks
are to regain profitability. This is widely recognized
outside Japan. For instance, the Bank for International
Settlements in its 2001 annual report (2002, p. 133)
notes that one of the contributing factors to the banks’
profitability problems is the “strong competition from
government sponsored financial institutions.” The IMF
2002 country report goes further and says that the (p.
3) “exit of non-viable banks and a scaled down role
of government financial intermediation are necessary
to improve bank profitability.”
Yet, despite making it a priority to privatize the post-
al savings system and otherwise reform many govern-
ment agencies, the Japanese government has encountered
strong resistance to its efforts to address this problem. The
postal savings system and the government’s home lend-
ing program are popular with the public. Furthermore,
the public has not been convinced that these programs
in fact are contributing to the banking troubles. Given
the public support, and the role that the postal savings
system plays in the Fiscal Investment Loan Program
(described below), it is not too surprising that many
politicians have fought the Koizumi administration’s
reform efforts, delaying a full-fledged attack on the
banking problems. However, without some adjustments
to these reform programs, the banks’ problems are like-
ly to reappear even if they were to regain solvency.
How much would recapitalization cost?
Assuming that the banks could figure out how to
resume making profits, the next obvious question is how
much would it cost to make the banks solvent? I review
first the three main problems that plague attempts to
arrive at an estimate, before reporting the range of
estimates currently made by market participants.
The first problem with this type of exercise is de-
termining the current level of losses associated with
existing loans. The banks in Japan are known for their
propensity to under-reserve against recognized bad loans.
For instance, they have set aside reserves sufficient
to cover between 40 percent and 60 percent of bad
loans over the last few years, whereas U.S. banks tend
to hold closer to 160 percent in reserves (Fukao, 2003).
By Fukao’s estimate, the banks are currently short at
least ¥7 trillion in loan loss provisions.
Then there is the larger problem of deciding how
many additional loans are in fact already bad, but have
not been revealed as such. Almost all analysts agree
that there are many more bad loans than the banks have
acknowledged. But there is considerable disagreement
over the size of the under-reporting. For instance, Credit
Suisse First Boston analysts estimate the ratio of prob-
lems loans for the seven major banks to total loans to
be just about 27 percent, roughly four times the dis-
closed figure.5 Meanwhile, Goldman Sachs estimates
that all bad debts (for the entire banking system) are
three times as high, ¥236.6 trillion (38.1 percent of
all system loans)!6
Translating the figures on nonperforming loans
into estimates of taxpayer exposure requires a further
step of netting out collateral and other bank reserves.
But carrying out this netting is challenging when the
underlying environment is still unstable and the re-
ported levels of problem loans keep rising. The ratio
of nonperforming to total loans has been steadily ris-
ing among the smaller banks in Japan. A first sign that
disclosed losses are catching up to actual bad loans will
be when the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans
levels off. In the meantime, much of the discrepancies
in estimates across analysts arise because of different
assumptions about under-reporting (and the methods
used to net the losses against other assets).
A second issue is the quality of the other parts of the
banks’ balance sheets. Two items in particular are treat-
ed in ways that overstate the apparent health of the banks.
One is that bank capital is permitted to include tax
credits against future profits. The figures for the largest
banks suggest that about 35 percent of shareholders’ eq-
uity is made up of these deferred tax credits for loan
losses.7 But for these credits to be of any value, the banks
must quickly regain profitability once the loan losses are
recognized: Tax loss credits expire five years after the
bad loans are actually worked out, so many of the ex-
isting credits will expire before they can be claimed.87
Another problem is that the banks hold a signifi-
cant amount of insurance company debt (usually in
the form of subordinated loans or surplus notes). As
I discuss in the next section, the life insurance compa-
nies also tend to hold large amounts of subordinated
bank debt and stock. Many of the life insurance com-
panies are also in a very precarious financial position.
This “double gearing” makes the banks and the in-
surance companies each look to be better capitalized
than is in fact the case.9
The ownership of life insurance securities is also
part of the broader tendency for Japanese banks to own
corporate equities. Fukao estimates that as of March
2002, the banks held equities worth roughly ¥34.4
trillion, which was substantially larger than their true
capital (by a factor of seven if one accepts Fukao’s
adjustments to correct for the overstated value of the
deferred tax credits, the under-reserving of bad loans,
and the preferred shares loans from the last public in-
jection of capital in March 1999). Thus, the banking
sector’s value is quite sensitive to changes in share
prices; based on Fukao’s figures, the decline of the
Nikkei from 11,025 on March 31 to 9,383 at the close
of September 30 would have wiped out all the banks’
private equity (assuming they had not bought or sold
any in the interim). Accordingly, the size of the mis-
match between the value of banks’ assets and liabili-
ties at any point in time depends importantly on the
level of stock prices at the time.
The Bank of Japan recently announced that it was
prepared to buy securities from the banks at market
prices. If the banks do accept this offer and sell at pre-
vailing market prices, this policy would have very little
short-run impact. The banks would still have to accept
any losses that were embedded in their portfolios and
doing so would erase their capital by the amount of
the losses. The only advantage for the banks would
be that they could opt to significantly reduce their equi-
ty holdings without necessarily pushing prices down.
Conversely, if the Bank of Japan were to pay a
premium for any securities bought from the banks,
then the premium would increase the banks’ capital.
But, the outline for the stock purchasing plan announced
by the Bank of Japan (2002c) states that the prices
will be at the market prices defined as “the lesser of the
volume-weighted average price or the day’s closing
price.” More importantly, the total amount purchased
will be limited to ¥2 trillion. Therefore, even if the
prices were substantially above the market price, the
potential transfer to the banks would be quite limited.
Finally, the amount of the funding needed to elimi-
nate the banking sector’s insolvency will depend on
the macroeconomy (for all the reasons discussed ear-
lier). The cost to the U.S. taxpayers of the U.S. bank-
ing crisis in the early 1990s turned out to be well less
than 1 percent of (then current) GDP, because of the
phenomenal growth of the economy over the 1990s.
It is very unlikely that Japan will experience anything
like that during its recovery, but differences of opinion
over the likely path of the economy over the near term
further contribute to the dispersion of estimates.
Given all these caveats, it should come as no sur-
prise that different observers reach fairly different as-
sessments about the amount of funding that would be
required to make the banks solvent. Table 2 shows the
estimates of many of the leading economists and bank
analysts as of August 2002, collected by direct corre-
spondence with the experts. They were each asked to
report their estimates of the difference in the market val-
ue of assets and liabilities of the Japanese banks (as
of August 1, 2002); as indicated in the table, several
of the responses cited previously published estimates
of slightly different quantities (for example, the value
of all problem loans or losses at major banks only).
The most optimistic figure would suggest losses of
less than ¥12 trillion (2.4 percent of Japanese GDP);
this would be the case if the baseline ING Securities
estimate were adjusted to take care of the phantom tax
credits that overstate capital by roughly 35 percent.
The Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers estimates
suggest losses that are roughly three times as high.
Regardless of which numbers one believes, it is clear
that the losses for the taxpayers will be substantial.
These figures and the foregoing discussion also ex-
plain why Takenaka’s Financial Sector Emergency Re-
sponse Project Team posed such a threat to the opponents
of reform. The task force’s initial recommendations
were reported to have centered on reducing the length
of time that could be used to claim tax credits as part
of banks’ capital, tightening loan assessment standards,
and forcing increased provisioning for losses. Signif-
icant changes in any of these directions would severe-
ly impact banks’ capital and likely could push some
(or nearly all) of the major banks below the mandated
level of capital. It is not surprising, therefore, that this
possibility triggered intense criticism of Mr. Takenaka
and his plan.
But, as the estimates in table 2 show, regardless
of whether the capital deficiency is recognized by the
regulators and acknowledged to the public, the private
sector analysts are unanimously of the view that the
banks are bankrupt—by a significant amount. This sug-
gests that barring a miraculous economic recovery that
no one is forecasting at this time, the banks will even-
tually be forced either to close or to raise more capital.8
This conclusion leads to two criteria that can
be used to judge policy proposals regarding bank re-
capitalization. First, it may be helpful to distinguish
between proposals that do and do not facilitate the
downsizing and consolidation of the banking sector.
If one accepts the earlier analysis, it is quite likely
that the road to profitability will come through focus-
ing on more profitable activities and shedding assets.
Under this view, the total level of capital to be com-
mitted to the industry should be determined by the
level needed to support the long-run size of the in-
dustry, not necessarily its current size.
Second, since money to bail out the banks is limited,
any refinancing proposed should be done in a focused
fashion. In particular, if exit of some banks is inevitable,
then it is poor policy to prop up banks that will soon go
out of business. Past recapitalizations in Japan did not
adhere to this rule, but featured across-the-board rescues,
whereby some of the money was wasted on dying banks.
These mistakes could be avoided if more market
signals were used to decide which banks merited fund-
ing. Banks that cannot attract private financing as part
of their recapitalization might be given lower priority
than those that can. This type of selective rehabilita-
tion would lead to the best banks being rebuilt. The
resulting banking sector would be more efficient at
directing funds to deserving borrowers.
Problems with the life insurance sector
The life insurance companies comprise the second
largest part of the financial system. As of March 2002,
the ten major private insurance companies had assets
of roughly ¥150 trillion (30 percent of GDP). Most
insurers are mutual companies so that their shares are
not traded on exchanges, but as explained earlier their
financial linkages with the rest of the financial system
are extensive. For instance, at least 10 percent of the
equity of each of the major Japanese “city banks” (that
is, those that are large and globally active) is owned
by insurance companies; as of March 2001, insurance
companies owned ¥5.4 trillion of bank equity and
¥5.1 trillion of subordinated bank debt. Thus, it is
necessary to recognize that the health of the insurers
is intimately connected with that of the banks.
Similarities with the banks
The problems of the life insurance companies re-
semble those of the banks in three respects. First, they
too have made bad loans. However, the scale of the
insurers’ lending mistakes is quite different. As of March
2002, the ten majors had disclosed ¥568 billion in
TABLE 2
Experts’ estimates of the insolvency of the Japanese banking system
Analyst          Firm               Estimate             Comments
(date of estimate)
David Atkinson Goldman Sachs ¥70 trillion of net loan losses Large bank losses represent
(October 31, 2001) based on March 2001 loans 161% of capital adjusted for
(¥18.7 trillion for the major tax loss carry forwards and
banks) public money.
Robert Feldman Morgan Stanley ¥22 trillion Intended to be a lower bound
(August 2002) for additional taxpayer exposure.
James Fiorillo ING Securities (Japan) ¥19.9 trillion in net loan losses, Capital (as reported without
(August 2002) –¥2 trillion in unrealized capital adjustments) ¥l6.2 trillion
gains
Yukiko Ohara Credit Suisse First Boston ¥21.8 trillion in required credit Estimated non-performing loans
Securities (Japan) Limited costs for the major banks for the major banks ¥121.9
(July 2002) trillion
Paul Sheard Lehman Brothers “To restore the balance sheet Notes that the deposit insurance
(August 2002) health and credibility of the fund has ¥49 trillion of untapped
banking system would probably capacity. Thus, infrastructure and
require ¥30 to ¥50 trillion.” budgeting are in place to act if
there were political will.
Reiko Toritani Fitch Ratings ¥23 trillion for the major banks Adjusting the stated value of equity
(August 2002) for the major banks as of March
2002 to account for fictitious
tax credits, public funds, and
unrealized gains implies a market
value of essentially zero.9
loans to distressed firms. This amounts to less than
2 percent of their total loans. Moreover, they had re-
serves against these loans of over 70 percent.10 Thus,
even if there is substantial under-reporting of the prob-
lem loans, the bottom line of the insurers is much
less likely to be affected.
Second, the insurers have very significant exposure
to the changes in the aggregate stock market. The Daiwa
Institute of Research (DIR) produces company by
company estimates of the levels of the stock market
at which unrealized gains on securities disappear.11
The critical value of the Nikkei 225 stock index for
the different firms is between 8,400 and 12,500, with
an average of 10,880. DIR estimates that as of March
31, 2002, when the Nikkei was at 11,024.94, the aggre-
gate unrealized gain on stocks was approximately ¥1.88
trillion. Fitch makes a similar calculation using cutoff
values for the Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX). With
the TOPIX at 903 (as of October 1), the Fitch estimates
imply that nine of the ten major insurers would have
unrealized losses in their equity portfolios.12
Third, the insurance companies also face acute
competition from the government-sponsored financial
institutions. In their case, the key competitor is the post-
al life insurance program. The postal insurance program
sells about one-third of the life insurance in Japan. While
the same convenience advantage accrues to the postal
insurance program as to the postal savings program,
the pricing of the insurance does not seem to be as dis-
tortionary. However, the premiums paid into the postal
insurance accounts are largely recycled through the
fiscal investment loan program, as described below.
Excessively optimistic estimates of returns
Despite these similarities to the challenges facing
the banks, the fundamental profitability problem for
the private insurers is unique and largely self-induced.
Primarily, they have been crippled by their overly op-
timistic assessment of anticipated investment returns.
For instance, as of 1992, the life insurance companies
were all selling lifelong annuities that promised to pay
a return of 5.5 percent. As interest rates fell, a gap opened
between what the insurers had promised to pay and
what they could expect to earn. This difference is re-
ferred to in the insurance industry as the “negative
carry” (or “spread”).
As of March 2002, the insurers had a disclosed
negative carry of ¥1.25 trillion. This flow loss can be
compared with the profits of roughly ¥3.3 trillion
from the other parts of their business. Because the
disclosed carry omits unrealized capital losses, these
figures are likely to provide an overly optimistic
reading of the firms’ health.
The regulatory assessment of the industry is based
on the concept of a solvency ratio, which is intended
to measure the extra capital that insurers are expected
to hold in order to make good on their promised pay-
outs. The formula for calculating the margin is com-
plicated and involves estimating the risks from insurance
underwriting, interest rates, asset management, and
business administration and then comparing the risk
with the insurer’s ability to pay (based on the quality
of its assets).13 Insurance companies around the world
are measured by this yardstick, and since 1999 Japanese
insurers have been subject to prompt corrective action
whenever their solvency margin fell below 200 percent.
The ten major insurers all reported solvency margins
in excess of 400 percent as of March 2002.
As with the banks, there are dramatic differences
between the officially reported solvency margins and
more realistic estimates. Fukao (2003) highlights three
problems with the standards used in calculating Japanese
solvency margins (compared with practices in the
U.S.). First, the Japanese supervisors use lower risk
weights than in the U.S. Second, the ability to pay is
inflated by including assets that have no liquidation
value. Finally, the ability to pay ignores unrealized
capital gains and losses.
Fukao finds that making these corrections to move
the Japanese figures toward the U.S. standard dramati-
cally lowers the margins. Using March 2001 data, when
the Nikkei 225 average was roughly 13,000, his esti-
mates show that three companies’ ratings (Mitsui Life,
Asahi Life, and Sumitomo Life) were all below the
critical level of 200. As reference, the official ratios
for all three were in excess of 490.
Ex post, Fukao’s adjustments seem to do a good
job of predicting which firms will fail. All the major life
insurers that have been distressed since mid-2000 (three
that went bankrupt and one that required a significant
equity injection by a foreign partner) showed similar-
ly low adjusted-solvency margins. With the Nikkei
now markedly lower than its March 2001 level, it is
likely that the next weakest surviving firms (Yasuda,
Meiji, and Daiichi) are also near the threshold.
Bailing out the life insurance companies
With the banks there is a strong presumption that
depositors must be protected (to prevent runs and con-
tagion). No similar argument can be made for insur-
ance companies. The insurers would be viable if they
simply had more realistic promised payout rates. The
obvious solution is to have the companies declare bank-
ruptcy and force the policyholders to take a reduced
rate on their investments.10
Political economy concerns regarding an insur-
ance company write-down should be less of a problem
than if a similar remedy were proposed for the banks
(that is, forcing the bank depositors to absorb the banks’
losses), the important difference being that the policy-
holders taking a haircut would be the ones that had ben-
efited from the overly generous payments. For the banks,
the depositors generally did not receive the loans that
are now unrecoverable. This difference probably ex-
plains why so many prominent insurance companies
have actually declared bankruptcy: eight major ones
between April 1997 and April 2002. In contrast, only
three of the large banks failed during this time.
The fact that the fundamental problem is so easi-
ly diagnosed is further confirmed by the behavior of
foreign competitors. Since the Big Bang deregulation,
foreign firms have raced in to partner with the insurers.
For instance, Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) note that
seven of the life insurance companies entered into
significant alliances with foreign companies in 1998
and early 1999. This outnumbered the number of
deals by the banks (six), despite the fact that there were
vastly more banks looking for partners. Instead, the
banks mostly worked out deals with other Japanese
firms. One interpretation of this contrast is that the
insurers are judged by potential investors as having
much more underlying value than the banks.
Collectively, these observations can be summarized
in three propositions. First, the continued functioning
of the insurance markets does not require that the gov-
ernment put money into the sector. Second, there do
not seem to be overwhelming political constraints that
prevent market solutions (that is, bankruptcy) from
working. Third, foreign firms see some underlying
value in the sector, so that perhaps entry or acquisitions
can be expected if the bankruptcies continue.
Thus, viewed in isolation, there seems to be no rea-
son to provide public money to rescue the insurers. The
weaker ones would be expected to fail, but the fallout
from this would be limited. The fact that the Life In-
surance Policyholders’ Protection Corporation of Japan
(the government bailout fund) is broke from past pay-
outs reinforces this possibility.
However, the banks and insurance companies are
linked through their double-gearing. Fukao estimates
that the banks hold roughly ¥2.2 trillion of the surplus
notes and subordinated debt of the insurers. Whenever
the insurance losses are recognized, the banks will have
to take their share of these losses. Unless the govern-
ment were to purchase these securities as part of the
bank clean-up, the banks would be at risk for requir-
ing more capital. At the very least, planning how to
decouple the two should begin and the banks and in-
surance companies should be encouraged to work to
sever their linkages.
Most outside analysts take it for granted that the
double-gearing is dangerous. For example, the Bank for
International Settlements’ 2001 annual report strongly
criticized this practice (2002, p. 135), saying “these in-
terlinkages increase systemic risk, particularly consider-
ing the weaknesses in the Japanese insurance sector.”
However, Japanese government policymakers do
not seem to recognize these risks. For instance, Shokichi
Takagi, Commissioner of the FSA, responded to the
BIS criticism saying that “the nature of the risks is dif-
ferent between insurance companies and banks. … As
far as the conventional approach is concerned, the na-
ture of risks is different and there[fore] the cross-hold-
ing of equity is not a big deal. So-called double-gearing
is not excluded at this point, as the nature of the risks
is different.”14 Thus, one big impediment to address-
ing this issue is the regulatory stance of the FSA.
Government-sponsored agencies
Finally, I consider the impact of the government
financial institutions. These organizations engage in a
host of activities, ranging from offering home mortgages
and providing life insurance and savings accounts to
financing highway development. They are relevant to
our discussion for two different reasons. The first is
that many of these agencies are losing money and will
ultimately require a taxpayer bailout. The money that
will be spent here constrains the funding that is avail-
able for the insurance and banking restructuring. Second,
these agencies’ losses are often related to operating
practices that limit the viability of complementary
private sector firms. Thus, one important public policy
issue is whether these government agencies should
continue to compete with the private sector firms.
Gauging the size of taxpayer exposure is very com-
plicated, since financial disclosure is poor and many of
the assets of these institutions are obligations of other
government institutions. A typical transaction starts
with a home loan extended by the HLC. The HLC would
raise the money to provide the loan by issuing debt
that is bought by the public and other government
financial institutions. Thus, determining the full tax-
payer exposure will potentially involve looking at the
financial condition of several organizations.
To do this systematically, I rely on the recent work
of Doi and Hoshi (2003). They focus on the financial
condition of the fiscal investment loan program (FILP).
The FILP is often called the Japanese government’s
second general account budget. Historically, most of
the money in this program was collected from people’s
deposits in the postal savings program. The ubiquitous11
branching system of the Post Office, combined with
branching and other restrictions that prevailed until
recently for commercial banks, led many Japanese to
keep their wealth in postal savings accounts. The money
in these accounts was then turned over to the Trust
Fund Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and
loaned out as MOF officials saw fit through the FILP.
The ability to direct funds to favored projects, which
are not easily monitored, makes this process very
convenient for political purposes.
Thus, one can think of the FILP money as funding
the financial institutions, as well as providing significant
money to local governments and many other programs.
Importantly, these programs are not integrated with
the central government’s budget, so that the obligations
for these programs are not part of the government’s
gross debt. In total, roughly ¥418 trillion (84 percent
of GDP) flowed through the system during the fiscal
year ending in March 2001. By assessing the health of
the FILP-dependent borrowers, we can not only learn
about the condition of key government sponsored fi-
nancial agencies, but also about the other hidden losses
that may be handed to the taxpayers.
In parsing the figures, it is instructive to separate
the condition of the financial institutions and other
special purpose agencies (that I collectively refer to
as the FILP agencies) from those of the local govern-
ments. The two differ both in the nature of the account-
ing information that is available and in the role that
they play in the economy. This leads to different levels
of confidence in our estimates of losses and potentially
different public policy implications. Thus, I follow
Doi and Hoshi and report separate estimates.
Quantifying losses for the FILP agencies
To see the problems for FILP agencies, we can re-
visit the HLC example described above. If all the un-
derlying assets are solid (in this case the assets associated
with the property loan), then the intermediate trans-
actions are irrelevant. The HLC debt can be repaid using
the proceeds from the loan and this means that the gov-
ernment financial institutions that bought the debt can
pay back their depositors. In other words, the relatively
low net position of the government is what matters.
If the HLC loan is not performing, then the situ-
ation becomes more complicated. In this case, the HLC
debt will not be fully paid with the proceeds from the
loan. But it is unlikely that the government will default
on the HLC bonds, so new funds must be raised to pay
the bond holders (and ultimately the depositors of fi-
nancial institutions that bought the debt). Effectively
this means that the gross amount of debt (that owed by
the HLC and the government financial institutions) is
the relevant figure for determining the government’s
obligations.
The quantitative gap between the gross and net
figures for Japanese government debt is huge. Japan
has the highest level of gross debt relative to GDP of
the G-10 (Group of Ten) countries and the lowest level
of net debt. Thus, one’s perspective on the quantita-
tive importance of any FILP losses (which are outside
of the official debt calculation) requires further judg-
ment about the quality of the central government’s
assets. A full analysis of the entire budget is beyond
the scope of this article, so I will tackle the narrower
question of the FILP losses, which turns on the asset
quality in the FILP transactions.
Doi and Hoshi point to three recurring problems
that suggest asset quality is low. First, there are three
cases (most notably the HLC) where past losses are
recorded on the agency books as an asset. The agen-
cies rationalize this by arguing that the losses were
sudden and it would be misleading to immediately recog-
nize them; instead they are expected to slowly elimi-
nate these losses by reducing their capital. To correct
for this inaccurate reporting, the first step in the anal-
ysis is to immediately count the losses. By doing
this, Doi and Hoshi write down the capital of these
three agencies by ¥0.5186 trillion.
A second more widespread problem is that many
agencies acknowledge that their loan losses exceed
their reserves. Doi and Hoshi estimate that this prac-
tice is employed by 22 of the 58 recipients of FILP
funds. In total, they estimate ¥8.2 trillion in recognized
bad loans have yet to be provisioned for. Of course,
there is the additional problem that there are likely to be
many more bad loans that have yet to be uncovered.
A third pervasive problem is the overvaluation of
physical assets. The Public Highway Corporation and
several other agencies do not properly account for de-
preciation. Instead, depreciation of assets is only re-
corded when operational revenues are high enough to
count the depreciation and still show “profits” on the
financial statements. A related problem is that the value
of long-term assets is generally based on the histori-
cal acquisition costs. For land purchased in the 1980s,
this will greatly overstate the current market value.
Doi and Hoshi attempt to correct for market value
changes and depreciation of the 12 FILP agencies that
have a high percentage of physical assets relative to
total assets. (These turn out to be agencies that are in-
volved in urban development or infrastructure provi-
sion.) It appears that losses of roughly ¥11.4 trillion
are uncovered once these corrections are made.
Finally, there is the problem that many FILP
agencies are making flow losses that need to be cov-
ered by taxpayers. Since fiscal year 1999, the agencies12
have been required to make a discounted present value
calculation of the gap between their revenues and costs.
Of the 33 agencies that report the figures for March
2001, 28 expected costs to exceed revenues. Moreover,
Kikkawa et al. (2000) find that agencies have been
extremely optimistic in their revenue forecasts. The
March 2001 estimates suggest that net losses will to-
tal ¥11.7 trillion, and this is certainly a lower bound
on the likely losses.
Doi and Hoshi do a careful agency by agency calcu-
lation of how all of the aforementioned problems will
affect taxpayers. By disaggregating in this way, they can
allocate any insolvency that is present in the agencies
to the government and any other stakeholders. More-
over, they compare losses to the amount of capital that
is already on the books to figure out how much more
money will have to be provided. They arrive at a (in-
tentionally conservative) cumulative estimate of
¥35.8 trillion (7 percent of GDP) for the taxpayer ex-
posure from the operations of the FILP agencies.
Other FILP losses
However, the full taxpayer bill also depends on the
other non-agency loans. As of March 2001, about ¥87
trillion of FILP funding was steered to local govern-
ments. Assessing the quality of these loans is difficult
since local governments are not required to produce
balance sheets or other financial statements that would
allow a direct estimate of the quality. However, the fact
that many local governments have substantial debts and
are running very small surpluses (or outright deficits)
suggests that some default on the debt is possible.
Doi and Hoshi run a variety of simulations to as-
sess the local governments’ ability to pay versus their
debt levels. The simulations differ according to the
assumptions that are made about the growth rates of
future deficits and tax revenues. The locals had FILP
obligations of ¥125.5 trillion as of March 2001. The
resulting estimates of the size of the losses borne by
taxpayers cluster between ¥30 trillion and ¥40 trillion—
importantly, this accounts for the fact that the FILP is
not the only creditor of the bankrupt governments
and nets out all collateral that is available.
Implications for government financial institutions
Combining all the estimated FILP losses, Doi
and Hoshi’s preferred estimate of likely FILP losses
is ¥78.3 trillion (just over 15 percent of GDP). The
sheer size of these potential losses no doubt makes
politicians hesitant to publicly acknowledge them.
However, without building some public recognition
of the losses, it will be difficult to undertake fully the
necessary reforms. In the meantime there are several
intermediate steps that would be useful.
One goal would be to stem taxpayer losses by re-
ducing the flow of FILP money to insolvent borrowers.
A FILP reform was enacted in April 2001 that could
lead to this outcome. As part of the reform, government
agencies were supposed to increase their funding through
public bond issuance rather than relying on captive FILP
financing. The reform, however, was inadequate in
two respects. First, it provided a generous transition
period during which money could continue to flow as
it had in the past. Second, it did not contain any pro-
visions for shutting down money-losing public corpora-
tions. Without such provisions, market discipline cannot
take hold. Indeed, Doi and Hoshi find that the flow
of funds through the FILP has not changed much.
Another goal is to limit the distortions for the private
sector associated with the continued operation of the
money-losing government-sponsored agencies. For in-
stance, the pricing of government loans and deposits
could be set to match the rates charged by the private
firms. A current proposal to charge for deposit insurance
on postal savings accounts would be a useful move in
this direction. Another pro-competitive move would
be to add prepayment penalties for government-agency
loans. The general principle should be that if these
kinds of agencies are to continue to operate, they should
do so on a level playing field with the private sector.
Conclusion
There are different reasons for the sizable losses
lurking in Japan’s banking, insurance, and government
agency sectors. Yet, the problems in these sectors are
inter-related. The banking problems that attract so much
attention will persist until the troubles in the other two
sectors are also addressed. A satisfactory resolution
requires recognition of the different driving factors
behind the problems in all three sectors and would
include measures that address all at the same time.
The combined effect of all the problems is huge.
Representative estimates for the banking problems are
roughly ¥40 trillion. I have argued that most of the
losses for the insurance companies will not be borne
by the taxpayers, but the FILP losses look to be at least
¥78.3 trillion. Thus, Japanese taxpayers are likely on
the hook for roughly ¥120 trillion (24 percent of GDP)!
A variety of factors have contributed to the delay in
confronting the problems. One huge problem is the gov-
ernment’s unwillingness to force the restructuring that
will be necessary to create a profitable banking sector.
The restructuring will lead to business closures and job
losses in the banking sector. Another serious problem
is the lack of political will to shut down or restructure
the popular, but unprofitable government-sponsored13
financial agencies. These organizations are especially
problematic since they further impair the competitive-
ness of the private sector.
The recent bail out of Daiei Inc., a large bankrupt
grocery store chain, shows how difficult this will be.
Daiei had ¥420 billion of its debt restructured in Jan-
uary 2002 by its three major lenders. However, it was
soon clear that the restructuring plan was insufficient
(since Daiei still had ¥1.7 trillion in debt) and that the
banks would need to accept more losses. In October,
the Japan Development Bank came forward and of-
fered ¥10 billion as part of a second restructuring plan
(that included another ¥50 billion from the private
banks). The move was hailed by the government as
helping to protect the 96,000 Daiei employees as the
restructuring continued.
But this tack is likely to be counterproductive in
several respects. One problem is that it sets a bad prece-
dent for future cases. The banks are already routinely
rolling over loans rather then pulling the plug on bank-
rupt firms, because if the banks did recognize the losses
they would be at risk for having too little capital and
being shut down. Banks will have even less reason to
recognize losses and take them when there is the chance
that government assistance will be offered.
1Because exchanges rates have varied substantially over the last
few years, I have opted not to convert figures into foreign cur-
rencies. Japanese nominal GDP has been roughly constant at
¥500 trillion for the last few years so I have normalized other
figures relative to this benchmark.
2I thank Robert DeYoung for calculating these figures from the
U.S. call reports.
3On April 1, 2002, the Industrial Bank of Japan, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank,
and Fuji Bank consummated their merger to form Mizuho Bank,
the largest bank in the world. See Associated Press Newswires (2002).
4Some of the gap is attributable to the slow development of the
syndicated lending market in Japan, since loan syndications
move revenue from the form of interest payments to fees.
5See Credit Suisse First Boston (2002), figure 8.
6See Goldman Sachs (2001), p. 77.
7ING Barings (2002).
8In principle, a slow winding down of the loan problems would
give the banks more time to take advantage of the tax credits. But,
as I explain below, stretching out the resolution of the problem is
likely to lead to more losses. See Goldman Sachs (2002).
9The banks issue securities that are bought by the life insurance com-
panies, which effectively buy the securities by turning over their
own securities. The net effect is that reported capital may be in-
creased but the amount of real money raised is greatly overstated.
10See table 11 of Merrill Lynch (2002).
11See table 6 of Daiwa Institute of Research (2002).
12See table 3 of Fitch Ratings (2002).
13The exact definition is 200 × (net assets/risk), where net assets
are defined as the sum of capital, risk reserves, general loan loss
reserves, excess reserves over the surrender value of policies, fu-
ture profits, subordinated debt (and loans), and a correction for
deferred taxes. The risk is the sum of business management risk
and the square root of squared insurance risk plus squared interest
rate plus asset management risk.
14Tagaki (2002).
NOTES
More importantly, the bailouts (and routine roll-
overs) that keep the deadbeat borrowers in business
also distort competition. Other firms that could enter
an industry or gain market share are held back. As
Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2002) explain, sup-
pressing the normal process of creative destruction
leaves all banks with fewer good borrowers to lend
to. Absent good borrowers, the banks have an even
greater incentive to roll over loans to deadbeat borrow-
ers. As the cycle progresses, the firms continue to lose
money and increase the banks’ losses.
Ironically, therefore, keeping the deadbeats alive
likely raises the final costs to the taxpayers. In essence,
continuing the lending to firms like Daiei amounts to
a covert unemployment compensation program. But
continuing to funnel the money through the banks
creates other costly distortions. Because this stifles
the creation of new jobs, there will be fewer alterna-
tives for the displaced workers and less tax revenue
accumulated to cushion the blow when the firm finally
fails or is significantly downsized. It would be cheaper
and more efficient to end this cycle promptly with a
large-scale, comprehensive intervention.14
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